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ABSTRACT
Path-tracking control of wheeled mobile robot (WMR) has
gained a lot of research attention, primarily because of its wide
applicability – for example intelligent wheelchairs, exploration-
assistant remote WMR. Recent increase in remote and au-
tonomous operations/requirements for WMR has led to more and
more use of IoT devices within the control loop. Consequently,
providing interfaces for malicious interactions through false
data injection attacks (FDIA). Moreover, optimization-based
FDIAs have been shown to cause catastrophic consequences in
feedback control systems while by-passing any residual-based
monitoring system. Since these attacks target system measure-
ment process, this paper focuses on the problem of improving
the resiliency of dynamical observers against FDIA. Specifically,
we propose an attack-resilient pruning algorithm which attempts
to exclude compromised channels from being processed by the
observer. The proposed pruning algorithm improves attack-
localization precision to 100% with high probability, which cor-
respondingly improves the resiliency of the underlying UKF to
FDIA. The improvements due to the developed resilient pruning-
based observer is validated through a numerical simulation of
a two-layer path-tracking control platform of differential-driven
wheeled mobile robot (DDWMR) under FDIA.
NOMENCLATURE
The following notations and definitions are used through-
out the whole paper: R,Rn,Rn×m denote the space of real num-
bers, real vectors of length n and real matrices of n rows and
m columns respectively. R+ denotes positive real numbers.
Normal-face lower-case letters (e.g. x ∈ R) are used to represent
real scalar, bold-face lower-case letter (e.g. x ∈ Rn) represents
vectors, while normal-face upper case (e.g. X ∈ Rn×m) repre-
sents matrices. 1 represents all-ones vector. Let T ⊆ {1, . . . ,n},
then for a matrix X ∈ Rn×m, XT ∈ R|T |×m is the sub-matrix ob-
tained by extracting the rows of X corresponding to the indices
in T . T c denotes the complement of a set T and the universal set
on which it is defined will be clear from the context. The sym-
bol ◦ denotes element-wise multiplication of two vectors and is
defined as z = x ◦ y, where zi = xi · yi. The symbol ∗ denotes
the convolution operator for vectors. supp(x) donotes the sup-
port of the vector x given by the set T = supp(x) = {i|xi 6= 0}.
argsort ↓ (x) denotes a function that returns the sorted indices of
vector x in descending order. The space of all square integrable
signals is denoted by L2. The space of all point-wise bounded
signals is denoted by L∞.
1 INTRODUCTION
Nonholonomic wheeled mobile robots (WMRs) have at-
tracted much attention in the past two decades due to its great
mobility and the broad range of applications [1]. Quite a lot of
researchers have developed path-tracking controllers for wheeled
mobile robots considering nonlinearities [2, 3, 4], robustness
against model uncertainties [5,6], robustness against noise [7,8].
The control strategies depend on the measurements of the robots’
velocities and/or location coordinates. However, due to the in-
creasing dependence on IoT devices and wireless communica-
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tion, the resulting tight coupling of computation, communication
and physical components enables malicious agents to inject at-
tacks via the sensors and actuators [9]. Consequently, controller
would make decision based on attacked measurements or the ve-
hicle would receive malicious control signals. One type of at-
tacks, false data injection attacks (FDIAs), has been shown to be
capable of fooling bad data detection (BDD) scheme to compro-
mise the integrity of the state estimator, even with very sparse
measurements corruption. This results in false operations of the
whole system without any alarm [10, 11]. Therefore, it is neces-
sary to develop an attack-resilient observer-based control scheme
to mitigate the effect of those attacks.
Many authors [9,12,13] have proposed an `0-based resilient
state estimators with different modifications or under different
scenarios. These estimators have been validated using cruise
control of autonomous ground vehicle, electrical power systems,
industrial control systems. However, with the exception of [13],
none of the estimators were validated against large percentage
FDIA. Also, in [14], a robot intrusion detection system (RIDS)
is designed by leveraging physical dynamics of mobile robots.
However, the detection engine is a residual-based Chi-square
scheme, which is known to be vulnerable to coordinated FDIAs
considered in this paper.
Inspired by recent developments in estimation and compres-
sive sensing, we propose a pruning algorithm to mitigate the ef-
fect of FDIA on UKF. Consider a linear measurement model un-
der attack:
y= Hx+ e,
where, H ∈ Rm×n is the linear measurement operator, x ∈ Rn is
the state vector, y∈Rm is the attacked measurement corrupted by
a sparse attack vector e ∈ Rm. Consequently, attack-resilient es-
timation is often formulated as a classical error correction prob-
lem [12, 15, 13, 9]:
Minimize : ‖e‖`0 Subject to: y= Fe,
where F ∈ Rn×m is a coding matrix with n m and FH = 0. It
is known [16, 17] that if the number of attacked nodes is small
enough, exact state estimation can be guaranteed by solving the
above problem. However, it is shown [18] that exact recovery
is unattainable by solving the problem above if more than 50%
of the sensor nodes are attacked. Moreover, the `0 optimiza-
tion problem above is NP-hard and is often relaxed by solving
a convex problem if coding matrix satisfies Restricted Isometry
Property (RIP) [16, 19].
Suppose there is an oracle which gives the exact supp(e) a
priori, then the resilient state estimation problem becomes trivial
since any decent regression algorithm will be able to recover the
states exactly from the non-attacked set. The challenge, how-
ever, is that no such oracle exists. Although, there is a host of
localization algorithms [20] designed to serve this purpose, they
are always not exact with significant false positive and false neg-
ative rates. This observation is the central motivation for de-
veloping the pruning algorithm. Therefore, the pruning problem
to increase the signal-to-attack-ratio of the measure-
ment system using any pre-designed inexact attack localization
scheme (subsequently referred to as the oracle). Then the ex-
isting least-square based robust estimation algorithms can be im-
plemented for the pruned measurements sets to create a resilient
estimator. This process requires a certain amount of redundancy
in the measurement system. Otherwise, the estimation prob-
lem will be rendered under-determined by the pruning process.
Quantifying the required redundancy level for a given oracle is
beyond the scope of this present work and will be addressed in
future work.
Although, there is a lot of work in the literature on re-
silient Kalman filtering, typical least-square based robust estima-
tor, mitigating sensors failures, distortion, delay, strong noise in-
terference and more reasons for corrupt signals [21,22,23]. How-
ever, the specific characteristics of attack, unbounded but sparse,
make those resilient filters be hard to perform attack-resiliently.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper represents one
of the earliest approach to prune measurement channels in real-
time in order to improve the resiliency of an underlying observer
against FDIA.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
a two-layer controller is designed, with UKF, to track a refer-
ence trajectory with noisy measurement system. In Section 3,
an optimization-based FDIA algorithm designed to bypass the
monitor is also implemented. In Section 4, the channel pruning
algorithm is developed and combined with traditional UKF to
create a resilient observer. In Section 5, simulation results are
presented to validate the proposed pruning-based resilient ob-
server. In Section 6, concluding remarks and future directions
are given.
2 path-tracking control for DDWMR
In this section, we present a basic two-layer observer-based
path tracking controller for a differential-driven wheeled mobile
robot (DDWMR). This will be the platform where subsequent
pruning algorithm and FDIA are implemented. Figure. 1 shows
the schematic of the DDWMR considered in this paper.
The dynamic and kinematic models of DDWMR are given
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Figure 1. Schematic Diagram of the Considered DDWMR Showing Rel-
evant Kinematic and Geometric Quantities
Figure 2. Schematic Diagram of the two-layer observer based control
system and the attack injection
by [24]:
q˙= M−1(−Dq+Bτ)+w, g(x,u)+w θ˙· · ·
z˙
=
0 1· · ·
C(θ)
q, C¯(θ)q, (1)
where, q= [v ω]> is the generalized body velocities vector, u,
τ= [τR τL]> is a vector of the wheels torques, and z= [x y]> is
the task-space position vector, x= [θ v ω]> is defined as a state
vector, w∼N (0,R) is the process noise in dynamics.
The kinematic and dynamical parameters are given by:
M =
[
m 0
0 md2+ J
]
, D =
[
0 −mdω
mdω 0
]
B =
1
r
[
1 1
L −L
]
, C(θ) =
[
cos(θ) −d sin(θ)
sin(θ) d cos(θ)
]
.
Given a reference task-space trajectory [θd(t) zd(t)>]>,
where zd(t) ∈ R2 is the corresponding planar Cartesian coordi-
nates of the desired trajectory. We assume that zd(t) is contin-
uously differentiable with bounded derivatives, and that all its
derivative up to the 2nd order are known. Next, consider the
tracking error given by
e˜=
[
θ−θd
z− zd
]
=
[
eθ
ez
]
. (2)
Then, the control law is then designed as:
τ= B−1(Mu+Dq), (3)
where,
u=−kq(q−qd)+ q˙d−C¯(θ)>e˜
with
qd =C−1(θ)(z˙d− keez)
q˙d =−ke(C˙−1(θ)ez+q)+C−1(θ)[z¨d +(ke+C(θ)C˙−1(θ))z˙d ]
and kq, ke are positive scalar control gains.
Proposition 1. Consider the control law given in (3), if con-
trol gains kq > 0 and ke > 0, then the tracking errors in (2) con-
verges to zero asymptotically. Moreover, the generalized veloc-
ities tracking error q˜ = q−qd converges to zero asymptotically
with z˙d =C(θ)qd satisfied in the limit.
Proof. Consider the candidate Lyapunov function:
V =
1
2
‖q˜‖2+ 1
2
‖e˜‖2 (4)
taking the first time derivative and substituting (1), (2), (3)
yields
V˙ =q˜>
(
− kqq˜−
[
0
eθ
]
−C(θ)ez
)
+ e>θ e˙θ+ e
>
z
(
C(θ)qd− z˙d
)
=− kq‖q˜‖2− (ω−ωd)eθ− e>z C(θ)(q−qd)+ e>θ e˙θ
+ e>z (C(θ)q− z˙d)
=− kq‖q˜‖2+ e>z (C(θ)qd− z˙d)
=− kq‖q˜‖2− ke‖ez‖2
(5)
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This implies that V˙ is negative semi-definite, and since V is
positive, it follows that V ∈ L∞. From (4), it follows that q˜, e˜ ∈
L∞, which also implies that eθ ∈ L∞.
Integrating (5) yields
V −V (0)≤−
∫ t
0
(
kq‖q˜(τ)‖2+ ke‖ez(τ)‖2
)
dτ
from which it follows that q˜,ez ∈ L2. Also, ˙˜q = −kqq˜ −
C¯(θ)>e˜ ∈ L∞ and ˙˜e= C¯(θ)q˜− ke
[
0
ez
]
∈ L∞, which implies that
e˜ and q˜ are uniformly continuous. Thus, by Barbalat’s Lemma
[25], it follows that
e˜(t)→ 0, q˜(t)→ 0
3 False data injection attack
An attacker can inject false data computed based on a partial
or complete knowledge of system model, in order to covertly and
accurately change the physical behavior of the plant [26]. This
section gives the notion of a monitor used in this paper. Based on
the monitor, we give a design of FDIA algorithm while assuming
an attacker has complete knowledge of system.
For the DDWMR described in previous section, we consider
a redundant measurement system of the form:
y=

1 0
0 1
1/4r L/4r
1/4r −L/4r
cos(θ) −d sin(θ)
sin(θ) d cos(θ)
 ·q+v, f (x)+v (6)
consisting of both linear and nonlinear components, where x =
[θ v ω]> is defined as a state vector, and v denotes measurement
noises.
Definition 1 (Residual-based Monitor of Horizon T ).
Based on the closed-loop system in Figure. 2, a monitor scheme
is any mapping of the form:
ΨT : {YT ,UT} 7→ {Ψ1,Ψ2}
where, YT =∈ Rm×T ,UT ∈ Rl×T are historical measurements
and controlled inputs for T horizon respectively, Ψ1 =
{0(sa f e),1(unsa f e)} is the first output argument indicating
whether or not the data contains attacks, Ψ2 = 2{1,2,··· ,m} is the
second output argument indicating the support of attacks’ loca-
tion.
The monitor outputs Ψ1 = {0} for any measurement vector
history YT = [yk,yk−1, · · · ,yk−T+1] and corresponding control
history UT = [τk−1 τk−2 · · ·τk−T ] if there exists estimate history
XˆT = [qˆk, qˆk−1, · · · , qˆk−T ] such that
‖qˆ j+1−g(qˆ j,τ j)‖ ≤ εw, j = k−T, · · · ,k−1
‖y j− f (qˆ j)‖ ≤ εv, j = k−T +1, · · · ,k
where εw and εv are any real numbers related to process noise
and measurement noise.
Otherwise, the monitor outputs Ψ1 = {1} and the support
of the sparsest attack vector history ET = {ek,ek−1, · · · ,ek−T+1}
such that
‖qˆ j+1−g(qˆ j,τ j)‖ ≤ εw, j = k−T, · · · ,k−1
‖y j− f (qˆ j)− e j‖ ≤ εv, j = k−T +1, · · · ,k
After linearizing (6) about the operating point x0 =
[θ0 v0 ω0]>, we discretize it using Euler’s approximation with
a sampling time Ts, and iterate forward Tf samples, one obtains:
Yf = Hxk +Gu f + e (7)
where, Yf =
[
yk yk+1 · · · yk+Tf
]>
,
H =

Cd
CdAm
CdA2m
...
CdA
Tf
m
 ,G = Ts

0 0 · · · 0
CdBm 0 · · · 0
CdAmBm CdBm · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
CdA
Tf−1
m Bm CdA
Tf−2
m Bm · · · CdBm

with
Am = I+Ts ·
0 0 10 0 2dω0
0 − mdω0md2+J −
mdv0
md2+J
 , Bm = Ts [ 0M−1B
]
,
Cd =

0 1 0
0 0 1
0 1/4r L/4r
0 1/4r −L/4r
−v0 sin(θ0)−dω0 cos(θ0) cos(θ0) −d sin(θ0)
v0 cos(θ0)+dω0 sin(θ0) sin(θ0) −d cos(θ0)

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Let H admits the singular value decomposition:
H = [U1 U2]
[
∑1
0
]
V,
where, U1 ∈ Rm×n, U2 ∈ Rm×(m−n), ∑1 = diag(σ1,σ2, · · · ,σn),
and V ∈ Rn×n, it is obvious that, the FDIA would pass the mon-
itor if the attack vector e is defined such that the attack mea-
surement ya is in the range space of the observation matrix H
(= Range(U1) ). Consequently, the FDIA is generated by solv-
ing the optimization problem:
Maximize ‖U1T >. yA‖2
Subject to ‖U2T >. yA‖2 ≤ α
(8)
for a given support T of attack locations under upper bound of
percentage of attack injection, and α is a threshold value related
to observation matrix H and monitor’s threshold εv.
4 Resilient pruning observer design
Data-driven attack localization algorithms [27, 28] are ef-
fective ways of achieving resiliency under FDIA. However, it
is challenging to correctly locate all attacked nodes due to the
fundamental inexactness associated with data-driven algorithms.
In this section, we propose a pruning algorithm to improve the
accuracy of localization algorithms. The underlying philosophy
is that if the measurement set is sufficiently redundant, a subset
with reduced attacked percentage can be obtained by systemat-
ically pruning the measurement set. If the attack percentage is
reduced to 0, the pruned measurement set is then used with UKF
to produce an improved resilient state estimation under FDIA.
Let the unknown actual support of safe measurements be
T c = supp(1− e) with an indicator vector q given, element-
wise, as:
qi =
{
1 if i ∈ T c
0 otherwise (9)
Suppose the localization oracle gives an estimated support Tˆ c
with qˆ. Then, the disagreement between the oracle and the actual
support can be modeled as:
qi = εiqˆi+(1− εi)(1− qˆi), (10)
where εi depicts the agreement between the estimated and actual
support as follows:
εi =
{
1 if qˆi = qi
0 if qˆi = 1−qi (11)
It is assumed that εi ∼ B(1, pi), where pi is given by the true
positive rate from the oracle ROC statistics. Moreover, one can
see that ∑mi=1 εi is Poisson-Binomially distributed with probabil-
ity mass function given by:
Pr
( m
∑
i=1
εi = k−1
)
= r(k),k = 1, · · · ,m+1 (12)
where [29], r=
m
∏
i=1
Pi ·
[ 1−P1
P1
1
]
∗
[ 1−P2
P2
1
]
∗· · ·∗
[ 1−Pm
Pm
1
]
, r∈ Rm+1.
Thus, given a reliability level η ∈ (0,1), we define the max-
imum integer lη ≤ m for which oracle will correctly localize at
least lη nodes with a probability of at least η:
lη = max
{
k
∣∣∣∣Pr( m∑
i=1
εi ≥ k
)
≥ η
}
= max
{
k
∣∣∣∣1− k+1∑
i=1
ri ≥ η
}
= max
{
k
∣∣∣∣ k+1∑
i=1
ri ≤ 1−η
} (13)
Next, we retain the oracle output for the first lη most trusted
nodes. Let s ∈ [0,1]m be a vector of confidence values for the or-
acle output for each node, then a robust support can be estimated
as:
Tˆ cη = Tˆ c∩
{
argsort ↓ (p◦ s)}lη1 . (14)
Remark 1. (13) and (14) constitute a pruning scheme for which
the resulting Tˆ cη excludes all attacked channel with a probability
larger than η,
Pr{Tˆ cη ∩T = /0} ≥ η.
Following the pruning operation, the safe measurement
model used for a UKF is:
yTˆ cη = fTˆ cη (x)+vTˆ cη . (15)
Following standard unscented transformation [30], we use
2n+1 sigma points to approximate the n-dimensional normally
distributed state x with assumed mean x¯ and covariance Px as
follows:
χ0 = x
χi = x+(
√
(λ+n)Px)i, i = 1, · · · ,n
χi+n = x+(
√
(λ+n)Px)i−n, i = n+1, · · · ,2n
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The corresponding weights for the sigma points are then given
by:
W m0 = λ/(n+λ),W
c
0 =W
m
0 +(1−α2+β)
Wi = 1/2(L+λ)
where, λ= α2(n+κ)−n represents how far the sigma points are
away from the state, κ ≥ 0,α ∈ (0,1], and β = 2 is the optimal
choice for Gaussian distribution.
Assume xk−1 ∼ N (x¯k−1,Px,k−1), sigma points update
through time in sequence with the pruning measurement model
in (15). Moreover, according to the corresponding weight, we
can predict the new time step state and calculate the new error
covariances between the sigma points and the predicted state as
follow:
X ?k = g(Xk−1,LTˆ cη (xˆk))
xˆ−k =
2n
∑
i=0
WiX ?k,i
Pˆx,k =
2n
∑
i=0
Wi(X ?k,i− xˆk)(X ?k,i− xˆk)T +R
Yk,Tˆ cη = fTˆ cη (Xk)
Next, the measurements and Kalman gains updates are given
by:
yˆk,Tˆ cη =
2n
∑
i=0
WiY(k,i),Tˆ cη
Pˆy,k =
2n
∑
i=0
Wi(Y(k,i),Tˆ cη − yˆk,Tˆ cη )(Y(k,i),Tˆ cη − yˆk,Tˆ cη )
T +Q
Pˆxy =
2n
∑
i=0
Wi(X ?k,i− xˆk)(Y(k,i),Tˆ cη − yˆk,Tˆ cη )
T
Kk = PˆxyPˆ−1y,k
xk = xˆk +Kk(yk,Tˆ cη − yˆk,Tˆ cη ), Px,k = Pˆx,k−KkPˆy,kK
T
k
where, Q and R are the measurement and process noise covari-
ance matrices respectively.
In order to numerically verify that the robust support gen-
erated by (14) can achieve 100% localization with a probability
of at least η, we implemented the pruning localization algorithm
in a numerical simulation with time-varying FDIAs. The results
Figure. 3 shows that the algorithm achieves 100% localization
even for reliability setting η = 0.5! When the reliability is set
to just 0.1, this algorithm misses only two attacked measurement
nodes.
Figure 3. Numerical Simulation of pruning algorithm with time-varying
FDIAs with η = 0.1, η = 0.5 and η = 0.9 (cross→ pruning, circle
→ oracle, dots at 0→ attacked nodes, the perfect result is all dots at 0
are covered)
5 Simulation
In this section, numerical simulation is carried out for
DDWMR using three observer strategies under FDIA and the
resulting path tracking performance and estimated inner states
are compared. The observers compared are: (1) Only UKF,
(2) UKF combine directly with the oracle and (3) the proposed
pruning-based UKF. For the path-tracking control system, the
control gains are set as k1 = k2 = 10. The nominal performance
of the control system with UKF in an attack-free setting is shown
in Figure 4. It is seen that the control system, together with UKF,
performs well when measurement contains no attack. Next, a
FDIA is implemented and the generated attack vector is added to
the system measurements. The oracle is simulated based on the
uncertainty model in (10) with defined true positive rate rp = 0.6
and confidence for each node localization s = 0.5. Localization
results were then generated to match the specified ROC statistics.
The pruning algorithm is implemented with η = 0.8. The codes
for simulation can be found in https://github.com/ZYblend/
Resilient-Pruning-Observer-against-False-Data-Injection-Attacks.
Figures 5, 6 and 7 show the comparison of the performance
of three observer strategies under FDIA: "only UKF", "UKF with
machine learning" and "pruning observer. The results show that
robot cannot track the trajectory under FDIA without any local-
ization and pruning operation, and the estimated dynamic states
has very large deviation from the true states. With the oracle, due
to the uncertainty, the tracking path is very oscillatory although
not as bad as with UKF alone. However, with the proposed ob-
server, the robot was able to track the reference path very closely
and smoothly.
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Figure 4. Path-tracking and state estimation results of the proposed con-
trol system without attacks
Figure 5. A comparison of path tracking results. The proposed pruning
observer-based control scheme is able to focus robot to track better, while
UKF cannot handle the attacks and machine learning cannot smooth the
trajectory. (dot line: reference trajectory, solid line: actual path)
6 Conclusion
In this paper, an attack-resilient path tracking control
scheme for wheeled mobile robot under an optimization-based
FDIA was designed. The main contributions include: (1) Sta-
ble path-tracking control system for DDWMR, (2) Optimization-
based FDIA for DDWMR, and (3) The pruning-based observer
design using UKF as the underlying observer. It was shown that
the proposed pruning-based observer significantly improves the
signal-to-attack ratio such that the UKF is able to resiliently es-
timate the state of the DDWMR even when portion of the sen-
Figure 6. A comparison of estimated forward velocity. The proposed
pruning observer gives more stable and accurate estimation.
Figure 7. A comparison of estimated angular velocity. The proposed
pruning observer gives more stable and accurate estimation.
sor measurements were subject to an FDIA. Although this paper
shows how promising the resiliency boosting through pruning al-
gorithm is, the results presented only represent the initial stages
of this development. Hence there are several open problems that
need to be addressed. We name a few:
1. As with other resilient observers, the pruning-based resilient
observer relies heavily on the inherent redundancy in the
measurement system [31]. However, there is no systematic
way to quantify the level of redundancy required given any
oracle. With `1-based methods, the RIP property partly pro-
vide answers to this question. What would be interesting
to see is how much of a relaxation do we get on the RIP
7 Copyright © 2020 by ASME
Figure 8. FDIAs are localized wrongly by residual-based monitor
requirements by including pruning? Partial answer to this
question can be found in [32]. We plan to expand on the
results as it applies to this problem.
2. It would be beneficial to see some results on the potential
gain by combining pruning and `1-based methods.
3. There are indications from this paper that it is possible to
combine pruning directly with the update laws of Kalman
filtering algorithms. In future, we will develop a systematic
way to achieve this.
4. We plan to generalize and identify the salient properties for
a class of oracles that would combine well with a given un-
derlying estimator.
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